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This article tests the empirical relationship between inequality and the
protection of personal integrity rights using a cross-national time-series
data set for 162 countries for the years 1980–2004. The data comprise
measures of land inequality, income inequality, and a combined factor
score for personal integrity rights protection, while the analysis controls
for additional sets of explanatory variables related to development, politi-
cal regimes, ethnic composition, and domestic conflict. The analysis
shows robust support for the empirical relationship between income
inequality and personal integrity rights abuse across the whole sample of
countries as well as for distinct subsets, including non-communist coun-
tries and non-OECD countries. The hypothesized effect of land inequality
is also born out by the data, although its effects are less substantial and
less robust across different methods of estimation. Additional variables
with explanatory weight include the level of income, democracy, ethnic
fragmentation, domestic conflict, and population size. Sensitivity analysis
suggests that the results are not due to reverse causation, misspecification
or omitted variable bias. The analysis is discussed in the context of
inequality and rights abuse in specific country cases and the policy impli-
cations of the results are considered in the conclusion.
Introduction
The U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch
annual reports on Brazil portray a remarkably consistent picture of the patterns of
human rights abuse across its numerous states that include multiple extra-judicial
killings; death squad activity linked to landowners and local police forces; extreme
police violence, particularly in the favela (shantytown) areas of Rio De Janeiro and
Sa˜o Paulo; and persistent impunity for these abuses, which are largely explained by
the incapacity of state judicial institutions to bring the perpetrators of these abuses
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to justice. In its report for 2006, the U.S. State Department (2007) claims that
death squads are now operating in 13 states across the country that are linked to
police forces who target ‘‘suspected criminals and persons considered problematic
by land owners or ‘undesirable.’’’ The Pastoral Land Commission and Ombuds-
men’s Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Development report numerous killings
and imprisonment of the rural landless and indigenous people as a result of the
struggle for land (see also Human Rights Watch 2007). Amnesty International
(2007) argues that there has been a ‘‘criminalization of poverty,’’ where the urban
poor are caught between criminal violence from drug gangs and heavy handed
police tactics, leading to large numbers of extra-judicial killings, damage to prop-
erty and infrastructure, the closure of businesses, and ‘‘curfew-like’’ conditions. It
is clear from these various reports that the victims across these many years of docu-
mented abuse are predominantly the urban poor, rural landless people, and indig-
enous peoples (see also Adriance 1995; Arias 2006; Branford and Rocha 2002;
Foweraker 1981). The broad commentary in the reports issued by these organiza-
tions posits a direct link between poverty, social exclusion, and access to land on
the one hand, and human rights abuses on the other, where the state has thus far
been incapable of providing protection for those rights guaranteed in the 1988
Brazilian National Constitution and the many international human rights treaties
to which Brazil is a party.1
Human rights scholars and practitioners have long argued that the different
categories of human rights (civil, political, economic, social, and cultural) are
inalienable, indivisible, and interdependent.2 Such connections have often been
merely declaratory in nature, and sit uncomfortably with social scientists engaged
in research that examines such connections empirically (see Boyle 1995;
Landman 2005a). The patterns of human rights abuse and the putative reasons
for them in the Brazilian case outlined above, suggests that these declarations
may well have some empirical support. But are the connections between land and
income inequality and human rights violations restricted to the Brazilian case? Or
is the relationship generalizable? Are countries with maldistributions of land and
income more likely to have higher levels of human rights abuse? Answers to these
questions have been partially provided in two different sets of literature. Studies
on political violence have long examined the relationship between different
forms of inequality (income and land) and general levels of political violence
(e.g., Gurr 1968, 1970; Hibbs 1973; Sanders 1981; Sigelman and Simpson 1977;
Weede 1986), where at best, the ‘‘repressiveness of the regime’’ (in our view, a
proxy variable for human rights abuse) features as an intervening variable modeled
to have an impact on political violence (e.g., Lichbach 1987; Muller 1985; Muller
and Seligson 1987; Wang et al. 1993; Weede 1986). Studies on the cross-national
variation in human rights protection operationalize human rights abuse as ‘‘state-
led terror,’’ but have rarely considered the relationship with different forms of
inequality (e.g., Heinisch 1998; Henderson 1993; Landman 2005a,b; Mitchell and
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
This article combines these two distinct sets of literature and tests the relation-
ship suggested by the Brazilian case3 using a large cross-national time-series data
1 As of December 2007, Brazil has ratified all the major international human rights treaties, with the exception
of the First and Second Optional Protocol to the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (see
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/index.htm).
2 One of the strongest expressions of this general idea of inter-relatedness of human rights can be found in the
1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action (A ⁄ CONF.157 July 12, 1993).
3 It is interesting to note that Muller and Seligson (1987, 436) claim that Brazil is a significant outlier (along
with Panama and Gabon) in the relationship between income inequality and political violence, where it has remark-
ably (and in many ways paradoxically) low levels of political violence given its relatively high level of income
inequality. In the current period, we see Brazil being a typical case in which high levels of inequality are associated
with significant abuse of human rights and violence.
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set for 162 countries between 1980 and 2004. The data comprise measures of
land inequality, income inequality, and a combined factor score for personal
integrity rights protection, and additional sets of explanatory variables related to
development (income, population size), political regimes (level of democracy
and communism), ethnic composition, and domestic conflict. Using a method
of estimation that takes into account the time-invariant and nearly time-invariant
nature of many of the variables in the model (Plu¨mper and Troeger 2007), the
analysis shows robust support for the relationship across the whole sample of
countries as well as for distinct subsets, including non-communist countries and
non-OECD countries. The findings also show support for land inequality (albeit
less robust), while the additional variables with explanatory weight include the
level of income, democracy, ethnic fragmentation, domestic conflict, and popula-
tion size. The article reviews briefly the extant global comparative literature on
political violence and human rights, considers the micro and macro theoretical
connections between inequality and human rights, describes the data and meth-
ods to estimate the model, presents analysis and findings, and then discusses
their implications for an additional set of cases beyond Brazil in an effort to
demonstrate the policy relevance of the findings.
Inequality, Political Violence, and Human Rights
The cross-national quantitative literature on political violence has invariably
included some form of inequality as a key explanatory variable, which has been
operationalized in terms of the distribution of income (some variant of the Gini
co-efficient) or land (Gurr 1968; Gurr 1970; Hibbs 1973; Muller and Seligson
1987; Sanders 1981; Wang et al. 1993). The general finding of a positive relation-
ship between high levels of inequality and political violence is often seen as med-
iated by the ‘‘repressiveness of the regime’’, or the propensity for the regime to
violate human rights (e.g., Gurr 1970; Hibbs 1973; Lichbach 1987; Muller and
Seligson 1987; Sanders 1981; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Wang et al. 1993).
Such a specification marginalizes the violation of human rights to a conditioning
factor among many others and not as a substantive focus for explanation in and
of itself. Moreover, the measure of political violence is normally so broad that it
includes state and non-state violence, or ‘‘deaths from political violence’’ in the
classic sense found in such sources as Taylor and Jodice (1983) or Banks (1994).
In contrast, this article is concerned with a particular form of violence: state
violence against citizens. It is our view that this kind of violence constitutes a viola-
tion of fundamental human rights found in international human rights instru-
ments, in particular the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the First and Second Optional Protocols to the ICCPR, and the
1984 Convention Against Torture and other forms of Cruel, Inhuman, and
Degrading Treatment. Human rights violations such as arbitrary detention, politi-
cal imprisonment, disappearance, extra-judicial killing, torture, and other viola-
tions of civil and political rights carried out by state agents comprise our
dependent variable. In this paper, we do not consider economic and social rights
or ‘‘structural violations’’ of human rights, but focus on rights to personal integ-
rity. Since the late 1970s (Claude 1976; McCamant 1981) human rights abuse
(arguably personal integrity rights abuse) has featured as a dependent variable
in its own right and not as some ‘‘mediating’’ condition that explains variation
in some other dependent variable (with the exception of the work on foreign
aid and human rights) (see Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Barratt 2004; Zan-
ger 2000a). There has thus been a precedent set in political science that sees the
variation in the protection of human rights as a substantive topic in need of
empirical analysis separate from the studies on political violence (Landman
2002, 2005a).
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Since the first cross-national statistical analysis on human rights in late 1980s
(Mitchell and McCormick 1988), there has been a proliferation of studies using
increasingly large and complex data sets and an expanding list of independent
variables (see Landman 2005a; Moore 2006). These variables most notably
include the level, pace, and quality of economic development (e.g., Henderson
1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999); the level, timing, and qual-
ity of democratization (e.g., Davenport 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004;
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005a; Zanger 2000b); involvement in internal and
external conflict (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999); the size and
growth of the population (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and
Keith 1999); foreign direct investment and ⁄or the presence of multinationals
(Meyer 1996, 1998, 1999a,b; Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999); the level of glo-
bal interdependence (Landman 2005b); and the growth and effectiveness of
international human rights law (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway
2002; Keith 1999; Landman 2005b; Neumayer 2005).
Virtually absent from this cross-national literature, however, are studies that
examine how acts of coercion and state violence toward citizens may be related
to patterns of resource distribution. The findings to date for those few studies
that do address this relationship remain mixed, especially for regional compari-
sons (see Duff and McCamant 1976; Henderson 1991; Muller 1985). The stron-
gest and most consistent set of findings are found in Heinisch (1998, 353-61)
who shows a negative impact for income inequality on both security rights and
subsistence rights for a synchronic cross-sectional analysis of 117 countries. In
the related literature on inequality and democracy, distribution of income,
land, or ‘‘power resources’’ is specified as an independent variable that helps
explain variation in the genesis and sustainability of democracy (e.g., Boix
2003; Boix and Stokes 2003; Midlarsky 1997, 1999; Vanhanen 1984, 1990, 1997,
2003).
Despite this relative lack of attention to resource distribution, there are both
micro-theoretical and macro-theoretical reasons for why a relationship between
inequality and human rights abuse ought to be observed. At a micro-level, there
are several theoretical arguments linking resource distribution to coercion, all of
which examine the link between assets, threats, and the propensity to employ
violence against opponents. The work on the logic of political survival argues that
in countries with a small winning coalition relative to the overall selectorate,
there are a series of incentives for tolerating corruption, rent seeking, and the
abuse of human rights (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005b, 180–2) in ways that
maintain loyalty among elites to the governing coalition. The desire of this rela-
tively small coalition to stay in power through any means necessary suggests that
such practices will be tolerated on a grander scale than in countries with a larger
winning coalition relative to the overall selectorate. For Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2005b, 180), these practices are the ‘‘bread and butter of leaders who depend
on a small coalition.’’ In similar fashion, Poe’s (2004) adoption of the Most and
Starr (1989) model of government decision making, shows that the relative
strength of a governing elite and its perception of threat are related to their use
of repressive strategies and the violation of civil and political rights, where pat-
terns of economic development represent a significant ‘‘entry point’’ for consid-
ering the relationship between the strength ⁄ threat ratio and abuse of human
rights (Poe 2004, 26–8). Finally, Boix (2003) argues that in highly unequal socie-
ties, the redistributive demands of the worse-off citizens on the wealthy are par-
ticularly intense. As a result, the wealthy have a strong incentive (i.e., higher
economic benefits) to resort to violence and repress popular demands for demo-
cratic institutions. Boix (2003) continues further that it is often the specificity of
assets within the economy that may also be an underlying correlate of repression.
Land represents the most important among the ‘‘fixed’’ assets that can be the
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target of expropriation and ⁄or distributional demands from below and thus
encourages repression.
At a macro-level, Cingranelli’s work has focussed on inequality and repression
(Cingranelli 1992; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004, 2007). He argues that societies
with inequitable distribution of income, power, and status among various ethnic,
religious, and racial groups will tend to have more oppressive governments (Cin-
granelli 1992). This general claim is operationalized more fully in his more recent
study on structural adjustment, where he argues that rapid economic liberalization
leads to greater income and wealth disparities, more civil unrest and conflict, and less
protection of civil and political rights (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004, 2007, 68–
73; see also Brohman 1996, 173–97). Moreover, Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007,
69) link their critical macro-theory with other micro-theories, such as principal-
agent models (e.g., Mitchell 2004) in arguing that the reduction in the size of gov-
ernment that can occur on those countries that have undergone some form of
structural adjustment means that fewer principals (e.g., government leaders) have
the ability to constrain the discretion of agents (e.g., police and soldiers) in ways
that will lead to less protection of civil and political rights.
These various arguments from the literature suggest that at a micro level,
there are incentives for the ‘‘haves’’ in society to engage in rent-seeking
behavior within governmental institutions, to maintain control of their
resources, and to exclude access to those resources by the ‘‘have nots’’ in
ways that use coercive means that undermine the protection of personal integ-
rity rights (see Heinisch 1998; Henderson 1991, 125; Poe 2004). The distribu-
tion, accumulation, and defence of resource allocation at the micro level is
historically driven and when aggregated to the macro level suggests that the
means for maintaining these patterns of distribution may well include viola-
tions of civil liberties and personal integrity rights. Moreover, in the context
of many lesser-developed countries, there can be state complicity and even
collaboration in acts of coercion. We thus expect to find empirical support
for a general relationship between inequality and human rights illustrated
through our discussion of the Brazilian case.
We specify an empirical model to test our main hypothesis that countries with
greater concentrations of income and ⁄or land will be more likely to have worse
records at protecting civil liberties and personal integrity rights (see Figure 1).
In addition to this main relationship we specify a series of control variables that
are drawn from the extant cross-national human rights and political violence lit-
erature (e.g., ethnic fragmentation, domestic conflict, population size, and eco-
nomic development). In addition, our analysis models the relationship for a
global sample of countries, all non-communist countries (or countries that had
FIG. 1. Modeling Inequality and Human Rights
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not been previously governed by communist regimes) to control for nationalized
assets and potential measurement errors in our land variable, and all non-OECD
countries to test for the relationship without the presence of advanced industrial
democracies. The data, methods, and further clarification on the expected direc-
tion of the effects for the independent variables are discussed in turn.
Data and Methods
The analysis uses a global data set on 162 countries between 1980 and 2004
(total N*T = 4050). The process of case selection turned mainly to questions of
data availability over time and was in no way a function of values on the depen-
dent variable. Microstates with less than half a million inhabitants were elimi-
nated, but the remaining cases provide meaningful geographical spread across
different regions of the world. The data set is comprised of variables for personal
integrity rights protection, income and land inequality, and the other variables
outlined above.
The Protection of Civil and Personal Integrity Rights
The protection of civil and personal integrity rights is operationalized using five
‘‘standards-based’’ (Jabine and Claude 1992) human rights scales: (1) the
Amnesty International version of the Political Terror Scale, (2) the U.S. State
Department version of the Political Terror Scale, (3) the Cingranelli and
Richards Index of Personal Integrity Rights (http://www.humanrightsdata.com),
(4) the Freedom House civil liberties scale, and (5) Hathaway’s (2002) scale of
torture, which relies on source material from the U.S. State Department. A sim-
ple bi-variate Pearson’s correlations matrix (see Table 1) indicates the existence
of clusters of large and significant correlation coefficients between the human
rights scales, suggesting that they may be measuring aspects of the same underly-
ing dimension. The correlations for the torture scale are the lowest across the
board, which reflects its more narrow focus on one form of human rights abuse
(Hathaway 2002), but the values within the table range from .498 to .822 and
are all at 99.9 percent levels of statistical significance. Given this degree of agree-
ment among the different scales, we used principal components factor analysis
to reduce the group of interrelated human rights variables. The analysis revealed
five components, but only one has an eigenvalue greater than 1 (i.e., 3.295) and
accounts for over 65 percent of the variance.4 The resulting factor loadings for
this component (see Table 2) clearly show a strong relationship between each
variable and the common underlying dimension they all measure. Moreover, the
component represents a set of human rights violations that are consistent with
Cingranelli and Richards (1999, 410) findings about the uni-dimensionality of
their aggregate ‘‘personal integrity rights scale.’’
Once extracted, the human rights factor score has been inverted to make more
intelligible its substantive meaning, where low values of the factor score corre-
spond to a low protection of human rights (high violations) and high values cor-
respond to a high protection of human rights (low violations).5 By definition,
this variable is normally distributed, with a mean of 0, a minimum value is )2.7
and a maximum value is 1.97. The use of this component has several distinct
4 Given a different time coverage across the scales, we adopted the ‘‘substitute missing values with the mean’’
option to deal with missing cases, and ensure the widest coverage of the factor-score. This procedure is justified by
the fact that missing cases are randomly distributed both across indicators and across countries (note also that for
each country year between 1980 and 2004, at least two indicators were available).
5 As alternative data-reduction strategy, we have standardized each of the five HR scales, and computed the
unweighted average. The empirical analysis undertaken here is based on the HR factor score. However, the use of
the ‘‘average’’ measure did not substantially alter the statistical findings.
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advantages. It simplifies the presentation of the empirical findings, reduces the
need for tests of robustness that substitute various specifications of the depen-
dent variable,6 and avoids using ordered probit estimation techniques that are
less easy to interpret than more standard regression estimators.
Inequality
For income inequality, we use a new measure based on the ‘‘inequality project’’
(UTIP) developed by James K. Galbraith and Hyunsub Kum at the University of
Texas, Austin. In an effort to overcome the well-known deficiencies of the
Deininger and Squire (1996) data set on income inequality (i.e., sparse coverage,
problematic measurements, and the combination of diverse data types into a sin-
gle data set), Galbraith and Kum use the UTIP-UNIDO measures of manufactur-
ing pay inequality as an instrument to create a new panel data set of estimated
household income inequality (EHII), which covers a large panel of countries
from 1963 through 1999, for nearly 3,200 country-years. This new dataset
provides comparable and consistent measurements across space and through
time, thus being a more valid proxy of income inequality than the Deininger
TABLE 1. Human Rights Scales Correlations
Variable PTS (AI) PTS (SD)
Torture
Scale
Freedom
House Civil
Liberties
CIRI
Physical
Integrity Index
PTS (AI) Pearson Correlation 1 .820** .606** .512** .774**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 3362 3322 1936 3296 3058
PTS (SD) Pearson Correlation .820** 1 .683** .589** .822**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 3322 3647 2112 3576 3318
Torture Scale Pearson Correlation .606** .683** 1 .498** .685**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 1936 2112 2198 2138 2059
Freedom House
Civil Liberties
Pearson Correlation .512** .589** .498** 1 .591**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 3296 3576 2138 3751 3378
CIRI Physical
Integrity Index
Pearson Correlation .774** .822** .685** .591** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 3058 3318 2059 3378 3445
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
TABLE 2. Component Loadings
Component 1
PTS (AI) .845
PTS (SD) .909
Torture Scale .684
Freedom House Civil Liberties .720
CIRI Physical Integrity Index .877
Extraction Method: principal component analysis.
6 We estimated the models that appear in this article using both the extracted factor score and the separate
measures for civil and personal integrity rights, but only report those for the factor score since the results did not
differ significantly (see the Analysis section).
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and Squire data usually employed by cross-national empirical studies (Galbraith
and Kum 2004). For the present inquiry, a linear interpolation of the original
EHII variable has been computed for each country-series to increase the number
of observations.7
For land inequality, we use a measure that is expressed as the area of family
farms as a percentage of the total area of land holdings (Vanhanen 1997). The
reasoning behind this measure is that the higher the percentage of family farms,
the more widely economic power resources based on ownership patterns of agri-
cultural land are distributed (Vanhanen 1997; 47). Family farms are defined as
‘‘holdings that are mainly cultivated by the holder family and that are owned by
the cultivator family or held in ownerlike possession’’ (Vanhanen 1997, 49). The
data on landownership were mainly derived from the FAO World Censuses of
Agriculture (from the 1960s to the 1980s) and Vananhen’s own estimations for
the 1990s. As with our income inequality data, these data were interpolated to fill
in missing time points for those countries where two or more time points of data
were made available.8 To make this variable equivalent to income inequality in
terms of its measurement of land inequality, it has been inverted by subtracting
the original percentage value from 100 such that a low score means a more
favorable distribution of land.
Other researchers have used different indicators to measure land inequality.
The most common alternative would have been the Gini index of land concen-
tration (Muller and Seligson 1987; Russett et al. 1964). This type of index calcu-
lates ‘‘the difference between an ‘ideal’ cumulative distribution of land (where
all farms are the same size) and the actual distribution’’ (Russett et al. 1964,
237–8). We prefer our measure to the Gini index for three reasons. First, without
controlling for the ownership of land, the Gini index does not adequately cap-
ture the relative distribution of economic resources among those who cultivate
the land, and is thus insensitive to the kind of asset inequality we believe is most
likely to be related to human rights abuses. Second, Brockett’s (1992, 172)
empirical analysis clearly demonstrates that land distribution data based on the
Gini index tend to underestimate land maldistribution in countries characterized
by the prevalence of landlessness among peasants. Third, the necessary data on
the number and size of land holdings (required to compute the Gini Index) are
not available for most of the developing countries, thereby seriously compromis-
ing the global perspective of our study (Vanhanen 1997, 50). The alternative
measure of land inequality adopted by Prosterman and Riedinger (1987) would
be more in line with our purposes, but again, of limited practical utility given its
small coverage.9
Democracy
For the level of democracy, we use the Polity IV 20-point combined democracy
score (DEMOC—AUTOC), which ranges from )10 to +10. The variable
POLITYIV2—which is also used here—incorporates the authors recommenda-
tions for transforming Polity ‘‘standardized authority codes’’ (i.e., )66, )77,
and )88 for interruption, interregnum, or transition) to scaled POLITY scores
7 Whenever missing, the first and the last observation year for each country series have been substituted with
the mean. A linear interpolation has then been computed.
8 The original decennial data on family farms are given in Vanhanen (1997), Appendix 5. These raw data pro-
vide a total of 384 observations in our sample, from which we performed a linear interpolation to fill in the missing
values.
9 Prosterman and Riedinger (1987, 10–11, 25) hypothesize that landlessness, rather than inequality in the distri-
bution of land, is the most important cause of deeply felt grievances among peasants. They define landlessness as
the lack of ‘‘ownership or ownership-like rights’’ among ‘‘those who cultivate the land’’ and measure it with the
percentage of landless peasants out in the entire population.
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so that the variable may be used consistently in time-series analyses without los-
ing crucial information by treating the ‘‘standardized authority scores’’ as miss-
ing values. Given the large number of consistent findings for the positive
relationship between democracy and human rights (see Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2005a; Davenport 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate
1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Zanger 2000b), we also expect a positive rela-
tionship for this variable.
Ethnic Fractionalization
The level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is measured using data from Alesina
et al. (2003). The fractionalization index is computed by using the Herfindahl
index of ethnolinguistic group shares, which represents an improvement over
existing measures (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999) by compiling a separate variable
for ethnic fragmentation. Their main goal is ‘‘to clearly distinguish between eth-
nic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity,’’ where ‘‘[a]lternative indicators tend
to lump together ethnic and linguistic differences as part of an ‘ethnolinguistic’
fractionalization variable’’ (Alesina et al. 2003, 158). Since their measure is
more disaggregated it has the potential for better differentiation between the
dimensions of fractionalization, even though some of those dimensions can be
overlapping.10 This variable is included since several studies on ethnic conflicts
have shown that multi-cultural societies are especially prone to political instabil-
ity, domestic violence, and eventually state terror, as authorities are more likely
to resort to coercive means to deal with ethnically based mobilizations and acts
of political dissent (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Walker and Poe 2002). In our
preliminary analysis of this variable, we discovered that its relationship with the
protection of human rights is curvilinear such that up to a point increasing frac-
tionalization is negatively related to the protection of human rights, but then
declines as the level of fractionalization increases. In other words, countries with
a small number of distinct lines of ethnic cleavage tend to have worse protec-
tion of human rights, while those with a large plurality of groups tend to have
better protection of human rights. We thus specify our model to include a
squared term of this variable to take into account this particular functional
form.
Domestic Conflict
As in the research on human rights and political violence, we include a variable
for internal domestic conflict, which is specified as an independent variable
alongside the other variables in our model. We do not use the simple dummy
variable for civil war from the Correlates of War project (Singer and Small 1994)
as in much of extant work on human rights, nor do we use events-based mea-
sures of the kind coded from single and multiple news sources found in the liter-
ature on political violence. The civil war dummy is still a fairly crude variable
that tends to absorb quite a lot of the explanatory space in most human rights
literature (see Poe and Tate 1994) and the events-based measures have proved
to be fairly insecure for the kind of cross-national and time-series comparisons
conducted here on grounds of validity and reliability. We thus employ the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measure of internal conflict, which is an
aggregate 12-point scale that comprises the overall risk levels for civil war and
threat of a military coup, terrorism and political violence, and general levels of
10 As they acknowledge, ‘‘It would be wrong to interpret our ethnicity variable as reflecting racial characteristics
alone, but it does reflect these characteristics to a greater extent than our language variable’’ (Alesina et al. 2003,
4–6).
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civil disorder. We feel that this measure is superior in some respects since it pro-
vides greater variance than the civil war dummy and perhaps greater validity than
the event-based measures of conflict to date. We expect this variable to have a
negative relationship with the protection of human rights, which is consistent
with the findings in both literatures.
Other Control Variables
The level of economic development is measured through the natural log of the value
of real per capita income (GDP, constant 2,000 US $), and is taken from the
World Bank Development Indicators. We expect this variable to have a positive
relationship with the protection of human rights.
Total population size is based on de facto definition of population, which counts
all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not per-
manently settled in the country of asylum, which are generally considered part
of the population of their country of origin. The variable is taken from the
World Bank and has been logged to correct for skewed distribution. We expect
this variable to have a negative relationship with the protection of human rights,
since more populous countries tend to have greater difficulty in protecting per-
sonal integrity rights.11
OECD membership is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a country is
an OECD member in a given year. We use this variable as a proxy indicator of
the ‘‘developed’’ vs. ‘‘developing’’ countries in the world.
Communist country is a dummy variable for those countries that are currently,
or have been, governed by a Communist regime. These countries and the years
within our data set include Albania (1980–1989), Armenia (1980–1991), Azerbai-
jan (1980–1991), Belarus (1980–1991), Bulgaria (1980–1989), China, Cuba,
Estonia (1980–1991), Georgia (1980–1991), Hungary (1980–1989), Kazakhstan
(1980–1991), Kyrgyzstan (1980–1991), Lao People Republic, Latvia (1980–1991),
Lithuania (1980–1991), Mongolia (1980–1991), Poland (1980–1989), Romania
(1980–1989), Tajikistan (1980–1991), Turkmenistan (1980–1991), Ukraine
(1980–1991), Uzbekistan (1980–1991), Yugoslavia (1980–1991), Czechoslovakia
(1980–1989), North Korea; USSR (1980–1991). As will become clear in the subse-
quent analysis, communist regimes have nationalized land holdings and operated
command economies both of which have an impact on our measures of land
and income inequality. We thus check the robustness of the model across
the entire sample of countries as well as subsets that do not include these
countries.
Methods of Estimation
Our data set follows by now what has become a standard construction of a
matrix of cross-section and time-series units, where variation in the variables and
the number of observations are maximized across time and space. Such data sets
do, however present a number of problems for estimating parameters using stan-
dard regression techniques. First, the error terms tend to be correlated from one
time period to the other (serial correlation). Second, the error terms tend to be
heteroskedastic, which means that they tend to have different variances across
units (Beck and Katz 1995, 637-8; Stimson 1985, 19). To control for serial corre-
lation, we model the dynamics of our data by introducing a Prais-Winsten (first
11 Beside theoretical reasons, the inclusion of population size variable is also justified according to methodolog-
ical concerns. Since the sources used to develop our dependent variable (human rights factor score) are based on
event count information, which do not control for population size itself, differences in population size must be
accounted for in any models using these data to avoid misspecification.
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order) autoregressive transformation.12 To control for heteroskedasticity, we
adopt a variation of White’s (1980) estimator of robust standard errors that
adjusts for clustering across countries.13
In addition to the standard problems mentioned above, our data set has the
additional problems of unit-specific effects14 associated with time invariant or
nearly time invariant variables (Plu¨mper and Troeger 2007). When unit effects
are present, but not explicitly modeled, their presence is picked up in the error
term, and consequently, if these unit effects are then correlated with one or
more explanatory variables, the error term too will be correlated with the explan-
atory variables, and simple OLS would produce biased coefficient estimates.
Plu¨mper and Troeger (2007) have devised a three-stage regression technique
known as ‘‘fixed effects vector decomposition’’ (FEVD) that ‘‘decomposes’’ the
explained and unexplained elements of the fixed effects and produces final esti-
mates that take into account the particular qualities of time invariant or nearly
time invariant variables.
In order to identify the time invariant and nearly time invariant variables in
our data set we compared the ‘‘between-unit’’ variation to the ‘‘within-unit’’ vari-
ation (see Table A1). We then used the rule of thumb that those variables for
which ‘‘between-unit variation’’ is 2.5 times larger than ‘‘within-unit variation’’
we specify as invariant or nearly invariant. Those variables for which this is the
case include income and land inequality, per capita GDP, population size, and
both forms of the ethnic fractionalization variable. We thus adopt the fixed
effect vector decomposition method of estimation and specify these variables in
the FEVD procedure as invariant. By doing so, we successfully combine the bene-
fits of an increased number of observations with the ability to control for unob-
servable country-specific differences, eliminating much of the omitted variable
bias of cross-section data.
Analysis and Results
In the first section of the article, we advanced the proposition that there is an
empirical relationship between inequality and personal integrity rights. The
bivariate correlation co-efficients for the whole sample over time lend support to
this general interpretation where the relationship for income inequality is stron-
ger than for land inequality (r = ).38; p < .001 and r = ).22; p < .001, respec-
tively). The multiple regression analysis estimates four different models that
include the main variables identified in the general model depicted in Figure 1,
but controls for different groups of countries. The dependent variable is the
human rights factor score, which varies from low protection to high protection
of civil liberties and personal integrity rights. The independent variables are
income and land inequality, the level of democracy, the two ethnic fractionaliza-
tion variables, domestic conflict, population size, and economic development. All
12 This solution departs from the standard method suggested by Beck and Katz (1995), advocating the inclusion
of a lagged dependent variable in the right side of the equation, but often the inclusion of a lagged dependent var-
iable tends to produce misleading results as it ‘‘may absorb large parts of the trend without actually explaining it’’
(Plu¨mper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 335,).
13 With the clustering option, we have assumed heteroskedasticity across units but not within units. This option
is available in the FEVD estimator, and is similar to the Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors
(PCSE) method, which assumes that the variance of the error term is heteroskedastic across panels and homosked-
astic within panels.
14 To detect the presence of unit-effects correlated with the regressors, we have run a Hausman test for unit
heterogeneity (Hausman 1978) and compared the estimates produced by a FE (fixed effects model) with the esti-
mates produces by a RE (random effects model). For all our four model specifications, the Hausman test is statisti-
cally significant, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity between the regressors and
the error term. We can therefore conclude that the presence of unit-effects is correlated with the regressors, which
are not adequately controlled for by simple OLS.
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the variables have been lagged one-year to control for simultaneity bias. All of
the models were estimated using the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD)
method of estimation discussed above.15 Table 3 reports the unstandardized co-
efficients with the robust standard errors in parentheses.16
Reading the column for the first model in Table 3 shows that both income
and land inequality have negative and significant effects on human rights protec-
tion, while the magnitude of the effect is greater for income inequality than land
inequality. These results are robust and largely unaffected by the subsets of coun-
tries included in the sample: both our variables remain statistically significant in
the global sample of 162 countries (Model 1) as well as in the models that
exclude the communist countries (Model 2), for the sample of non-OECD coun-
tries (Model 3) as well as the sample that excludes both the communist and the
OECD countries (Model 4). Democracy has a positive and significant effect on
human rights protection (i.e., is associated with lower levels of violation). Eco-
nomic development has a positive and significant effect on protection, while
TABLE 3. Non-instrumented Models
Model 1
Model 2
Non-communist
Model 3
Non-OECD
Model 4
Non-communist
Non-OECD
Constant 4.255*** 4.449*** 5.138*** 5.286***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.064) (0.065)
Income inequalityt ) 1 )0.037*** )0.041*** )0.021*** )0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Land inequalityt ) 1 )0.006*** )0.005** )0.004** )0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls
Level of Democracyt ) 1 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ethnic fragmentationt ) 1 )1.388*** )1.316*** )0.330*** )0.128***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.024)
Ethnic fragmentation
squaredt ) 1
1.706*** 1.606*** 0.293*** 0.067**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.032)
Domestic conflictt ) 1 )0.023*** )0.026*** )0.026*** )0.028***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Population sizet ) 1 )0.243*** )0.244*** )0.289*** )0.298***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Developmentt ) 1 0.244*** 0.241*** 0.092*** 0.087***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Eta 0.933*** 0.942*** 0.929*** 0.942***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
D-W (transformed) 1.92 1.94 1.90 1.91
Adjusted R2 .82 .82 .71 .71
N 1678 1637 1277 1236
Dependent Variable: HR factor score. Unstandardized beta coefficients reported with robust standard errors in
parentheses (adjusted for clustering by country). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001.
Method of Estimation: fixed effects vector decomposition. This includes a variable (labeled eta), representing the
unexplained part of the estimated unit effects, or the residual from regressing the unit-specific effects on the
observed time-invariant and rarely changing variables. It approaches 1 by construction (Plu¨mper and Troeger 2007,
5–6).
15 The xtfevd ado file and help file (for Stata 7.0.-9.x) is available at Thomas Plu¨mper’s Web page http://
www.polsci.org/pluemper/xtfevd.htm.
16 The Durbin-Watson statistic after the Prais-Winsten transformation shows that no further correlation in the
error terms is suspected.
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domestic conflict and the size of the population both have negative and signifi-
cant effects (i.e., are associated with higher levels of human rights violations).
These findings for this set of variables are entirely consistent with findings in the
extant cross-national literature on human rights. As outlined above, our initial
modeling (not reported here) of ethnic and religious fragmentation revealed
that ethnic fragmentation exhibits a ‘‘u’’ relationship with human rights protec-
tion (hence the inclusion of the original variable for ethnic fractionalization and
its squared version). In other words, human rights violations increase with an
increase in ethnic fragmentation, but once such fragmentation reaches a certain
point, human rights violations begin to decrease as inter-ethnic fractionalization
becomes more dispersed.
Depending on the size of the sample, the marginal effects of our inequality vari-
ables vary, being quite substantial both in absolute terms and relative to the other fac-
tors considered to be powerful predictors of cross-country variations in human
rights protection. Our results show that one standard deviation decrease in the level
of income inequality would produce a 26 percent increase in the level of personal
integrity rights protection, whereas one standard deviation decrease in the level of
land inequality would produce a 13 percent increase in the personal integrity
rights protection. The stronger findings for income inequality17 suggest that
income distribution may well have more of a consistent impact on the protection
of human rights than land distribution. This might confirm—albeit indirectly—the
conclusions of previous studies about the lower level of political mobilization of
rural workers and landless peasants (Collier and Hoeffler 2004): the rising oppor-
tunity costs of violence associated with rural environment might in turn require less
aggressive anti-human rights policy. On the other hand, it might well be that in this
instance income inequality has been measured better than land inequality. Indeed,
as Seligson (1997, 282) pointed out, misspecification errors might affect the major
source upon which our measure of land inequality is estimated: ‘‘census data can
have systematic bias, under-representing the largest farms and over-representing
the smallest farms.’’ If so, the estimates used by Vanhanen might artificially pro-
duce more egalitarian land tenure conditions, therefore decreasing the magnitude
of the effect of land inequality variable in our models.18 It is also telling that the
magnitude and significance of the coefficients for the inequality measures are
roughly similar to those for our other explanatory variables, suggesting that we
have captured significant additional explanatory factors that, to date, have
remained relatively under-examined.
Some Potential Problems: Endogeneity and Misspecification
Our main finding is that the existence of asset inequality (at least insofar as land
is concerned), and income inequality help explain the cross-country variation in
personal integrity rights violations. But are these results clouded by an endogene-
ity problem? Might the abuse of personal integrity rights be the cause of higher
inequalities, instead of—or in addition to—the reverse? If this is the case, we
might not have correctly specified the direction of the relationship in our empir-
ical models correctly. Indeed, several effects might lead to a reverse—or at least
17 We re-estimated the models using a different strategy for missing-data (i.e., substituted all missing data with
the country average rather than estimating linear interpolation) and the results were almost identical.
18 Moreover, Vanhanen’s measure of land inequality presents some limitations for the subsample of socialist
and former socialist countries, since the agricultural surveys of the FAO usually count both private small-holders
and communal holdings as individual farm holdings, thus artificially over-representing the inequality of ‘‘access’’ to
land in socialist and former socialist countries (Frankema 2006, 7). The lack of statistical data for socialist countries
forced Vanhanen to estimate the share of private farms and use it as a proxy to indicate the percentage of family
farms. We dealt with this potential measurement error by excluding the communist countries from our sample for
alternative model estimations.
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simultaneous—relationship. For example, more rights abuses might be related to
greater income inequality, if economic elites use violence to control the workers
and successfully repress collective forms of protests for better wages and access
to land. According to this perspective, human rights violations can be considered
as the starting point, which covers political decisions to shift assets and resources
to the economically privileged. Indeed, the historical experience of land-abun-
dant countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa shows that the landown-
ing elites tend to develop coercive labor market institutions (in the form of
slavery or modern forms of peonage) and forcefully restrict access to land to
underprivileged groups in order to protect their economic interests within the
land market (Domar 1970; Engerman and Sokoloff 2005).
To rule out these potential sources of a two-way relationship and mitigate bias
of the regression estimates in our models,19 we specified a two-stage least-squares
(2SLS) estimator, re-running the original models with multiple instrumental vari-
ables.20 The instrumental variables were selected drawing on a vast array of stud-
ies analyzing the determinants of income and land inequality.21 They include:
(1) one dummy variable capturing the special conditions associated with Iberian
colonization,22 which are expected to have interfered in the distribution of land
and income; (2) one variable measuring the percentage share of Catholics out
of the total population, to capture the impact of the Catholic Church on the dis-
tribution of land;23 (3) two continuous variables on ‘‘fuel’’ and ‘‘ores and met-
als’’ exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports,24 capturing the
impact on inequality of particular resource sectors which are location-specific
and may be confined to secured enclaves;25 and (4) one variable measuring agri-
culture’s share of GDP, as a proxy for capturing the human capital formation
and the availability of skilled workers within the economy.26
19 To detect potential endogeneity bias, we have performed further statistical diagnostics by computing a
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) augmented test (Davidson and Mackinnon 1993). Regardless of the variables used as
instruments, the regression results consistently indicated that we could reject the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity
for both our explanatory variables (land inequality and income inequality).
20 More precisely, we have specified an instrumental variable estimator on stage 2 of our FEVD estimator.
21 Here, the difficulty is to find outside data (or instruments) that are uncorrelated with the unit specific effects
and at the same time partially correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables. Clearly, the fist condition can
never be checked and must therefore be maintained as assumption. However, following Wooldridge (2003, 473),
we verified the second condition by a simple regression between the selected instrumental variables (IVs) and each
of the two endogenous explanatory variables. Regression coefficients were always significant and in the expected
direction.
22 This variable has a value of 1 for each former Iberian colony, 0 otherwise. Previous studies have identified
specific colonial institutions among the historical determinants of land inequality. For example, Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997) point out that land inequalities reflect the specific paths of colonization followed in Iberian colo-
nies, where the deliberate expropriation of land and the exploitation of forced labor were two complementary
aspects of the same ‘‘extractive’’ colonial policy. Likewise, Frankema (2006) argues that Iberian colonial institutions
such as the encomienda and the latifundia played a crucial role in shaping long-term patterns of unequal distribution
of land and income.
23 The variable is taken from La Porta et al. (1999). Previous studies have argued that countries in which the
Catholic Church has become a powerful institution inherited high levels of land inequality. According to Van Oss
(2003), the Catholic Church established specific inheritance laws in order to enlarge its landed estates and traded
salvation in return for generous gifts from the faithful Christians. As result of this process, the extent of the
Church’s estates reached impressive size, shaping long-term patterns of land inequality in Spanish America. See also
Lal (1998) and Frankema (2006) for insightful analysis of the long-term impact of the Catholic culture on patterns
of socio-economic development.
24 ‘‘Fuel’’ comprises the commodities in section 3 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SICT),
including mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials. Ores and metals comprise the commodities in SITC sec-
tion 27 (crude fertilizer, non-oil minerals), section 28 (metalliferous, ores, and scrap), and 68 (non-ferrous metals).
The data for both variables are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
25 Given the nature of the extraction process for these commodities, countries that are more dependent on
these exports will have greater concentrations of economic activity in resources that are not widely distributed.
26 The data for this variable are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We included this vari-
able as an additional instrument following Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998), who have shown that human
resource endowments or the share of skilled workers in total labor force exert significant income equalizing effects.
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The results of the instrumented models are shown in Table 4. Regardless of
the subset of countries considered, the coefficients for income inequality are still
statistically significant and even slightly larger in their magnitude compared to
the original (noninstrumented) models. As for the land inequality variable, the
variable is still statistically significant but its effect appears substantially reduced.
This might suggest that the effect of land maldistribution on rights abuse is not
robust to the use of an alternative estimator. However, the results might also be
due to the changes in the sample size across models. Indeed, in small samples
the IV estimator can have a substantial bias (Wooldridge 2002, 465)—and ⁄or
to the choice of poor instruments, that is to say IVs that are in fact correlated
with the error term.
In addition to addressing the endogeneity problem, we have also carried out
further tests to explore two potential sources of specification error, respectively
referring to the possibility that unobserved regional and international factors are
the underlying correlates of personal integrity rights abuses. Perhaps the cross-
national variation in inequality and rights violations are both independently
caused by regional specificities such as political culture and historical legacies
and ⁄or international phenomena such as economic globalization. If this is the
case, then the empirical relationship found in our models might actually be spu-
rious. To control for regional-specific effects, we added six regional dummies to
TABLE 4. Instrumented Models
Model 1
Model 2
Non-communist
Model 3
Non-OECD
Model 4
Non-communist
Non-OECD
Constant 12.927*** 12.578*** 10.951*** 9.704***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Income inequalityt ) 1 )0.158*** )0.157*** )0.104*** )0.087***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Land inequalityt ) 1 )0.0001*** )0.0001*** )0.001*** )0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls
Level of Democracyt ) 1 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ethnic fragmentationt ) 1 )0.839*** )0.859*** )1.594*** )1.587***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Ethnic fragmentation squaredt ) 1 2.035*** 1.841*** 2.286*** 2.050***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Domestic conflictt ) 1 )0.023*** )0.026*** )0.026*** )0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population sizet ) 1 )0.383*** )0.349*** )0.392*** )0.361***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Economic Developmentt ) 1 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.053***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Eta 0.933*** 0.942*** 0.929*** 0.942***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
D-W (transformed) 1.92 1.94 1.90 1.91
Adjusted R2 .82 .82 .71 .71
N 1678 1637 1277 1236
Dependent Variable: HR factor score. Endogenous variables: Income Inequality; Land Inequality. Instruments: agri-
culture’s share in GDP, mineral exports, fuel exports; Catholic population; Iberian colonial heritage.
Unstandardized beta coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering by
country). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001.
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our models.27 With a few exceptions, these variables always reached levels of sta-
tistical significance, suggesting that regional specificities do take place in addi-
tion to the country-specific effects (already accounted for by the fixed-effects
estimator). What is more interesting, however, is that both our explanatory vari-
ables maintain their statistical significance and do not show substantial variation
in the magnitude of their effects.
To control for international factors, we re-ran our models by controlling for
two alternative measures of economic globalization, including: trade dependency
and foreign direct investments net inflows, both expressed as a percentage of
GDP (World Bank Development Indicators WDI 2004). Across all model specifi-
cations, the estimates for our explanatory variables were almost identical (in a
few cases, the beta coefficients changed only slightly and never substantially),
while the effects of economic globalization were either insignificant (trade
dependency) or inconsistent across the samples (foreign direct investments).
Drawing on these findings, we can be more confident that the empirical relation-
ships observed in our models were not affected by omitted variable bias due to
the exclusion of regional specificities or globalization-induced effects.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article has sought to give greater attention to the idea of the distribution of
resources and how it is related to the violation of civil and personal integrity
rights. Such a distribution of resources was operationalized using measures of
income and land inequality, both of which capture longer-term social processes
of accumulation that we argued ought to be related to personal integrity rights
violations. The results of our analysis suggest that findings for income inequality
are stronger than those for land inequality. They also suggest that the descriptive
account of the human rights situation in Brazil at the outset is one that can be
generalized across the world. Brazil is in many ways a ‘‘typical’’ case that falls on
the prediction line of our model estimation. It has had an historical record of
maldistribution of income and land, and the persistence of personal integrity
rights abuse, despite being a middle-income country. In addition to Brazil, Peru
and Guatemala are other countries from the Latin American region that have
high levels of income and land inequality and particularly troublesome records
at personal integrity rights abuse. In sub-Saharan Africa, typical cases include
Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, while in South
Asia and the Pacific, the typical cases are India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. In
our sample of countries, these are all cases that fall more or less on the predic-
tion line with above average scores for income inequality and below average
scores for the protection of personal integrity rights.
But the direct relationship between the relative concentration of income and
human rights violations illustrated through these cases and our more general
analysis is clearly mediated by other factors, such as the level of democracy, eco-
nomic development, as well as the level of domestic conflict and ethnic fraction-
alization. Democracy offers avenues for giving voice for those with grievances
and for those who seek to challenge the concentration of resources in the ways
that have been measured in this article. Moreover, the presence of multiple veto
points (which is necessarily higher in those countries with higher levels of
democracy) and stronger mechanisms for vertical and horizontal accountability
have the most impact on decreasing human rights violations (see e.g., Bueno de
27 We followed the World-Bank classification of world region and specified the following macro-regions:
Sub-Saharian Africa; Asia, Eastern Europe; Latin America and Carribean; Middle East; Oceania; Western Europe
and North America. One dummy variable was excluded to avoid collinearity.
730 Inequality and Human Rights
Mesquita et al. 2005a; Davenport 1999) even in the countries with less favorable
distribution of resources.
But what are the pragmatic lessons to be learned from the analysis conducted
here that may be of use to human rights practitioners interested in bringing
about a more just world? The findings presented here provide new evidence that
supports the general contention that different categories of human rights may
well be inter-related. Broad patterns of concentration of resources (particularly
income), which some would see as violating the notion of the ‘‘progressive reali-
zation’’ of economic and social rights, are related to patterns in the abuse of per-
sonal integrity rights. This article has shown that not only are high levels of
national income related to the protection of personal integrity rights, but the
distribution of that income, as well as a more equal access to crucial economic
assets such as land, are also related to the protection of those rights. It thus
builds on the earlier work by adding the social justice dimension and demon-
strating its link to the protection of civil and personal integrity rights. Thus,
efforts to promote economic growth and development should also place more
emphasis on the quality of development to include the distribution of national
wealth as it is accumulated. Though politically difficult and never without contro-
versy, governments can address questions of income and land inequality through
policies of agrarian reform and progressive taxation in ways that alleviate the
worst forms of poverty and social exclusion. Indeed, our results demonstrate that
politically inclusive institutions (in the form of democratic regimes) might not be
sufficient to prevent rights abuses. Governments also need to pursue the realiza-
tion of economically inclusive institutions, which spread the benefits of progress
and development to all individuals in society.
One reading of the results suggests that democracy and or processes of democ-
ratization have tangible benefits that include a better protection of human
rights, since democracies offer additional institutional mechanisms for citizens to
channel their grievances in ways that can reduce their social and political precar-
iousness captured in our measures of inequality and personal integrity rights pro-
tection. Another reading of these results, however, suggests that despite the
positive relationship between democracy and the protection of personal integrity
rights, the relationship between rights and inequality is upheld even after con-
trolling for the level democracy. While international donor agencies and donor
countries such as the World Bank, UNDP, DFID (UK), CIDA (Canada), SIDA
(Sweden), and DANIDA (Denmark) have become more explicit since the 1990s
about the connection between the quality of governance and its impact on devel-
opmental processes, it seems that in practical terms, income re-distribution and
land reform ought to be coupled with the establishment and maintenance of
democratic institutions that constrain the tendency to concentrate resources
through mechanisms of vertical and horizontal accountability. In this way,
resource redistribution and democracy building can be combined in ways that
ought to have significant benefits in reducing the abuse of personal integrity
rights.
While this study represents a preliminary effort at measuring and analyzing
the impact of inequality on human rights protection, it clearly shows the impor-
tance of taking inequality into more serious consideration in cross-national stud-
ies of human rights violations. However, several aspects deserve further
investigation. First, future studies would benefit from better data on distinct
dimensions and types of inequality, both in terms of more precise estimations
and temporal (as well as spatial) coverage. If so, it might be interesting to move
beyond inequality between individuals and explore how ‘‘horizontal inequalities’’
(Stewart 2002) or systematic inequalities between culturally formed groups—such
as ethnic, religious, and regionally defined groups—affect human rights
protection. Furthermore, future research may need to move beyond aggregate
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national averages to measure phenomena (such as inequality), which might well
show high degree of spatial heterogeneity, and instead consider sub-national unit
of analysis. Our country case examples of Brazil, Peru, and Guatemala, for exam-
ple, are all cases in which both inequality and the abuse of human rights show
great spatial variation, where there are known regions within these countries with
high levels of inequality and human rights abuse (e.g., the Northeast in Brazil
and the highlands of Peru). Sub-national data on inequality could be coupled
with equivalent sub-national measures of human rights violations in order to
overcome the ‘‘whole-nation bias’’ and avoid the risk of miscoding cases and
drawing insecure inferences. The need to move beyond national-level data and
employ the sub-national method has been recently emphasized in different fields
of comparative politics, such as democratization studies (Snyder 2001) and ‘‘con-
tentious politics’’ (Tarrow 2007).28 Thus, in our view, future research ought to
include disaggregated data on inequality, violence, and rights abuse in ways that
reveal thus far ‘‘hidden’’ and unobserved forms of abuse that are in need of sig-
nificant national, regional, and international attention.
Appendix
Table A1. Independent Variables Used in the Statistical Analysis (Summary
Statistics with Between-unit and Within-unit Variation)
Variable Mean St. Dv. Min Max N
Income inequality
Overall 43.48 7.16 20.07 64.75 3306
Between 7 20.76 58.13
Within 2.09 31.98 61.81
Land inequality
Overall 52.92 20.99 2 100 3229
Between 20.14 4.12 92.44
Within .57 9.62 83.86
Level of democracy
Overall .91 7.42 )10 10 3541
Between 6.37 )10 10
Within 3.77 )13.63 13.03
Ethnic fragmentation
Overall .46 .26 0 .93 3802
Between .26 0 .93
Within 0 .46 .46
Ethnic fragmentation sq.
Overall .28 .24 0 .87 3802
Between .24 0 .87
Within 0 .28 .28
Domestic conflict
Overall 3.41 2.83 0 12 2630
Between 2.16 0 9.16
Within 1.80 )2.29 10.08
Population size
Overall 15.93 1.54 12.30 20.98 4016
Between 1.54 12.47 20.86
Within .16 13.52 16.68
28 Tarrow refers to the lack of statistical significance of land inequality found in several studies of civil war and
points out that ‘‘land inequality … in a region in which insurgency erupts may be washed out statistically if other
regions in the country are relatively equal in landholdings. Only arduous and uncertain collection and analysis of
subnational statistics … make it possible to deal with the subnational sources of insurgency’’ (Tarrow 2007, 589 our
emphasis).
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Appendix: (Continued)
Variable Mean St. Dv. Min Max N
Economic development
Overall 7.43 1.59 3.80 10.78 3568
Between 1.56 4.57 10.38
Within .22 5.16 8.70
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